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Financial instruments today often are issued along with assessments of their 
quality by credit rating agencies (“CRAs”). The assessments are in the form of 
ratings (A, B+, B, etc.). These ratings are based on (a) the risk that the issuer 
of an instrument will default; and (b) the effectiveness of debt collection con-
ditional on default. The effectiveness of debt collection, in turn, is a function 
of (c) the quality of the law that will be applied to assess the parties’ rights and 
obligations; and (d) the efficiency of the legal system in which the instrument 
will be enforced. The higher is the rating, the lower is the interest rate the is-
suer must pay. 
Professor du Marais and his colleagues analyze the way CRAs condition their 
ratings on the effectiveness of debt collection. Three such agencies are studied: 
Standard and Poor, Moody’s and Fitch. The method used was to conduct inter-
views of “stakeholders”, the CRAs, “top managers of all kinds of issuers”, and 
staff of the regulators. All of these interviews were conducted in France. 
The paper does not distinguish clearly between the quality of law to be applied 
and the efficiency of the collection system. It is unclear whether the CRAs 
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make this distinction clearly themselves. In any event, the paper has two posi-
tive conclusions: (a) CRAs prefer statutes to cases. That is, they give greater 
weight to a desirable legal rule that is contained in a statute than to the same 
rule that is the product of high court opinions; and (b) CRAs give greater 
weight to instruments that will be controlled by and enforced in the legal sys-
tems of England and the US than to the French legal system and systems simi-
lar to it. The CRAs’ preferences are consequential, amounting to several inte-
rest rate points for an issue. 
The paper claims that the CRAs are making a mistake. In the authors’ view, 
CRAs are using “doubtful indicators”, and their preferences reflect “unscienti-
fically based biases”. As a consequence of these deficiencies, CRAs “are un-
dervaluing the bonds and securities issued in markets belonging to the less pre-
ferred legal traditions”. 
This paper is in the line of papers that make serious studies of private instituti-
ons that affect the law and markets.1 These institutions have not received suffi-
cient scrutiny, so this paper is welcome. In my view, the paper’s positive fin-
dings are valuable but its normative critique needs more work. Thus, this 
Comment should be taken as a request for further research. My remarks are in 
three categories: market responses; ratings criteria; and data issues. 
II. Markets 
There are two market issues: arbitrage and incentives. Regarding arbitrage, the 
paper claims that issuers that use disfavored legal systems pay excessive inte-
rest rates because their instruments are rated as more risky than the instruments 
actually are. Purchasers, however, should demand these instruments because a 
purchaser can realize a high interest rate but pay an artificially low price. The 
price of the undervalued instruments thus will be bid up until the interest rates 
they pay are appropriate to the risks they pose. Put another way, systematic 
underpricing is not sustainable in markets with sophisticated players. Therefo-
re, if the CRAs’ ratings are lower than they should be for the disfavored legal 
systems, arbitrage will insure that the issuers of instruments in those systems 
will not suffer an interest rate penalty. 
The paper thus should explain why arbitrage does not solve the problem it i-
dentifies. To be sure, CRAs may appear to be black boxes, but there are many 
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years of history of instruments issued under various legal systems, and the pur-
chasers are smart. If instruments issued under French law, say, routinely out-
perform their ratings, purchasers will have high demand for French instur-
ments. Perhaps regulation prevents some purchasers from buying low rated 
instruments, but not all purchasers are regulated. Without a discussion of arbit-
rage, therefore, it is unclear that there is a problem here. 
Regarding incentives, assume that asymmetric information exists between the 
issuers and the purchasers of financial instruments: that is, the issuers are bet-
ter informed about default probabilities than the buyers. The function of ra-
tings is to reduce the information asymmetry. The rating agency, an informa-
tional intermediary, communicates information about default to the buyers. As 
the information gap between issuers and buyers falls, the buyers have less need 
to discount an instrument’s expected returns. Thus, holding the level of risk 
constant, an accurate ratings system increases the prices – i.e., reduces the inte-
rest rates – of instruments. 
Turning to incentives, a CRA cannot make profits unless issuers will use it; the 
issuers choose the CRAs. Every issuer wants its instrument to have a high ra-
ting, but a CRA cannot systematically overrate the instruments it certifies. If it 
did, the uninformed purchasers would bid down the price of every instrument, 
regardless of its quality. Then even instruments whose high ratings are justi-
fied will be underpriced. Consequently, high quality issuers have a strong in-
centive to avoid a CRA that overrates. A CRA therefore must make some low 
ratings in order to attract issuers.2 It would seem best for a CRA to attach those 
low ratings to weak issues. Competition among the CRAs for issuers together 
with smart buyers therefore creates incentives for CRAs to rate every instru-
ment accurately. The paper does not discuss incentives, so it does not contest 
this conclusion.3
                                                
2 This is a standard unraveling result. To put it formally, assume that instruments come in three 
quality levels: high − qh –, average – qa – and low – ql. If a CRA routinely overrates issues, 
the buyers’ rational response is to offer prices that reflect a downgrade: an issue that is rated 
high will be regarded by the buyers as average, and so forth. Thus, for example, buyers will 
treat a high quality issue as if its rating were qa < qh. If another CRA rates accurately, then the 
high quality issuer would use it. Consequently, in equilibrium the CRA that overrates will be 
employed only by the lowest quality issuer; the others will defect to the accurate rating 
agency. Since it is difficult to make profits serving only the worse issuers, the subject CRA 
would be compelled to issue accurate ratings. 
3 The recent subprime debacle in the US is an exception to this argument. There, issuers, ap-
parently for the first time, packaged mortgage obligations of borrowers who differed widely in 
their ability to repay. The rating agencies’ unfortunate response to observing the aggregated 
debts of a highly heterogenous set of borrowers was to overrate the debt issues. In contrast, 
the debt issues that Professor du Marais and his colleagues study commonly are issued by sin-
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III. Ratings Methods 
The presumption that CRAs are issuing correct ratings could be overcome in 
two other ways: by a showing that CRAs are structurally incapable of accura-
cy, or that CRAs are using mistaken criteria. The paper shows that CRAs have 
lawyers and consult lawyers. It seems that CRA structures are sufficient to ge-
nerate the right knowledge. The paper rather claims that the CRAs use mista-
ken criteria. This claim could rest on two grounds: The CRAs (a) are deciding 
on the basis of good data, but are aggregating the data incorrectly; or (b) are 
using the wrong data. The paper seems to make the former claim. That is, the 
paper claims that CRAs are giving excessive weight to laws that are embodied 
in statutes, and giving excessive weight to debt issues that are issued in juris-
dictions with common law origins. 
These claims may be correct, but they require more argument. As to the first, 
statutes are passed by legislatures, and legislatures are more representative – 
more democratic – institutions than are courts. Thus, a CRA may infer from 
the fact that a policy is enacted in the form of a statute that (a) the law has mo-
re democratic legitimacy than the same law if it were inferred from case deci-
sions; and (b) that the state enacting the statute will be serious about enforcing 
it. In addition, statutes commonly are more difficult to change than case deci-
sions; statutes, that is, are more stable than cases. The CRAs preference for 
statutory law thus seems justifiable because buyers of instruments under-
standably prefer legal legitimacy, a commitment to enforce contracts and sta-
bility. Instruments with these virtues, that is, should be highly rated. 
The preference for Anglo/American legal regulation probably is not a function 
of these countries’ use of the common law method. In both countries today, 
commercial behavior is largely regulated by statute. England and America are 
attractive to commercial parties for three other reasons: Relative to other 
countries, these countries (a) have a strong preference for freedom of contract; 
(b) their judges are highly sophisticated commercially; and (c) their bar – the 
lawyers – have an excellent grasp of business issues. When the issuers of an 
instrument and the buyers are private parties, they want the state to enforce the 
contract that is embodied in the instrument they wrote. Consequently, private 
parties prefer judges who are committed to enforcing what the parties did, jud-
ges who understand what the parties did, and judges who are aided by lawyers 
who also understand what the parties did. Theory suggests, therefore, that in-
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struments should have higher expected values when regulated and enforced 
under Anglo/American law. 
To summarize, both the CRAs’ preference for statutory law and their preferen-
ce for common law jurisdictions seem justifiable to outside observers. The pa-
per thus should devote more time to showing why these observers are mista-
ken. 
IV. Data 
The paper claims that the CRAs’ preference for the US bankruptcy system is 
not well based. Both the US and the French systems are statutory, for example. 
The CRAs’ preference may be justified on the reasons just given, however. In 
the US, bankruptcies are administered by bankruptcy judges. While these jud-
ges vary in quality, the judges in the leading US bankruptcy districts (Delaware 
and New York) are well versed in commercial and insolvency affairs, they had 
been lawyers for leading law firms before their appointment to the bench, and 
they are fair and honest. Similarly, in England many bankruptcies are admi-
nistered under the London System. This is a decentralized system that is large-
ly under the control of the creditors. These creditors too are expert and honest. 
Turning to data issues, there are two widely used criteria to assess the efficien-
cy of bankruptcy systems. The first is time in the system. The second criterion 
is net recoveries. For example, a system that nets unsecured creditors 30 cents 
on the Euro is more efficient, other things equal, than a system that nets unse-
cured creditors 10 cents. The paper would be more persuasive regarding its 
disagreement with the CRAs’ preference for US bankruptcy law if it showed 
that the US system does poorly, relative to other systems, on the criteria of 
time in the system and net recoveries. This data has not been presented. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper treats an important subject: the performance of private, largely un-
regulated institutions whose output has significant public consequences. The 
paper also uses a well recognized methodology: surveys of the participants in 
the system. And the paper has illuminating results: that CRAs prefer statutory 
to case law and prefer common law jurisdictions to others. The paper’s criti-
cism of the CRAs preferences is less persuasive, however. Economic and poli-
tical economy analyses suggest that the CRAs’ preferences do not cause harm 
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and are justifiable. Nor does the paper present data to overcome these views. 
The authors thus have more work to do. 
